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Expenditure by the South African government on
the criminal justice system for the financial year
2009/2010 constitutes a total of nearly R71 billion.
This is approximately ten per cent of the total
national budget of R738,6 billion. Considering the
National Treasury’s expectation that the value for
money maxim for public service expenditure
should apply, or to paraphrase a quote from the
2009 Estimates of National Expenditure,1 ‘to get the
biggest bang for every buck’, it seems appropriate
to put the practices and processes of this cluster of
departments (Safety and Security, Justice and
Constitutional Development, and Correctional
Services) under the spotlight. 
Most state departments preside over commodities
that are of value to citizens, making them a target
for the unscrupulous. Departments are entrusted
with special responsibilities and it may be the case
that when their functions are not properly
executed, it could adversely affect our
fundamental rights to life, security, and freedoms.
Police officers are required to enforce the law,
thereby protecting law-abiding citizens’ rights to a
safe and secure environment; judicial officers
adjudicate criminal and civil offences, ensuring
that those transgressing the law are incarcerated;
and, finally, correctional services staff detain
inmates and take responsibility for their
rehabilitation. Cases of corruption, fraud and
general unethical conduct should be identified
and addressed, especially if we want ‘to get the
biggest bang for every buck’.
With the professional support of the Department
of Correctional Services, the author is engaged in
a research project within the department. This
empirical research effort was initiated in 2006 and
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The prevention of corruption is a common theme of the election manifestos of most political parties in the
run-up to the general elections of 2009. This development is without doubt due to the many allegations of
wrongdoing among officials within the ruling party and its senior appointments to the public service. The
loss of public trust in the South African government and the public service has been the main consequence
of these allegations. Internationally, governments have put corruption prevention on their agenda. Many
remedies for unethical conduct have been proposed, including a free press, independent courts of law,
scrupulous behaviour by political leaders, and government reform. It is then up to individual countries to
decide what ‘mixture’ of remedies should be applied. This article argues that our efforts to enhance ethics
and integrity would benefit more by promoting, for example, an ethical organisational culture in the
criminal justice system than overly focusing our attempts on prosecuting allegedly corrupt political
leaders. 
 
is a combined qualitative and quantitative research
project with the objective to determine the extent
to which the department is successful in
managing its ethics programmes. Various research
tools have been used, including personal and
group interviews, site visits, document analysis,
and the design and administration of a web-based
questionnaire. For the purposes of the project, two
regions of the department have been identified,
with six management areas randomly sampled.
This excludes research visits to an additional three
management areas not included in the sample.  
The results from this project are expected in 2009
and will serve as baseline data for the department,
whereas a follow up project, possibly within the
next three years, could provide for culmination
data. This project could also be followed up by
similar projects in the departments of Safety and
Security and Justice and Constitutional
Development. Data emanating from such projects
could serve to improve integrity and ethics in the
criminal justice system, provide value for money
and ensure that the rights of law-abiding citizens
are upheld.
In the following sections the utility of corruption,
its negative consequences on society and, finally,
appropriate strategies to promote integrity, will be
discussed.  
WHAT CORRUPTION OFFERS THE
BRIBERS AND BRIBED
In contemporary public service, officials are
entrusted with a variety of duties originating from
specific legislation, generally known as delegated
legislation. In some instances public officials
allocate scarce commodities to citizens, using
specific policy guidelines, and in other instances
public officials are required to regulate public
order and enforce compliance with public service
regulations. In both these instances, officials are
granted discretionary authority that creates
opportunities for corruption.2 In yet a different
environment benefits are allocated using a
number of pre-determined policy criteria, of
which the benefits are not necessarily limited in
supply, for example, determining when a ‘Grade
D’ prisoner could be upgraded to a ‘Grade C’
prisoner and qualify for greater privileges.
Corruption – in the form of paying a bribe, or the
act of extortion – serves a number of purposes.
Bribes can serve the purpose of circumventing
specific policy requirements. For example, old age
grants might only be payable to elderly citizens
with no alternative form of revenue and no capital
assets. Knowing that s/he would under normal
circumstances not qualify for such a benefit, a
citizen could bribe an official to ‘qualify’ for it.
Essentially, bribes undermine the goals of a
programme since benefits will be awarded not to
the needy or the best qualified, but rather to those
with the highest willingness to pay. Even those
who qualify may be forced to pay when officials
with discretionary powers decide to create scarcity
by delaying approvals or withholding them.3
Secondly, bribes can serve as an incentive payment.
Public officials are generally not as well paid as
private sector employees, nor properly supervised,
and may even go so far as to impose additional
delays in the bureaucratic process. Paying a bribe
would thus serve as an incentive to public officials
to work productively and more efficiently. In
another example, unscrupulous offenders with
access to money and ‘outside connections’ can
make payments to receive special privileges,
whereas honest and poorly resourced offenders
are marginalised.4
Thirdly, where governments impose costs in the
form of taxes, regulations and customs duties,
bribes can serve the purpose of lowering these costs
to those willing to pay. Companies may pay to
have regulations interpreted in their favour, or
even to reduce the imposed costs of such
regulations. Public officials may bend or even
ignore rules and regulations to enrich themselves.
Payoffs may occur during the issuing of business
licences, the inspection of construction and
building sites, and the regulation of
environmental hazards and workplace safety.
Businesses and individuals may collude with tax
collectors and customs agents to avoid paying
taxes and customs duties. Public officials may
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reduce or eliminate tax liability on property for
citizens, and customs officials may overestimate
the value of goods to extract payoffs, or even
undervalue imports and earn a share of the
resulting benefits. Taxpayers and corrupt officials
then divide the savings in taxes and duties.5
Finally, bribes permit illegal activity. Businesses
operating illegally frequently attempt to gain
protection from the police, politicians and judges
by paying them off. Law enforcement authorities
(police, judges and prosecutors) can also demand
payments to overlook violations of criminal law,
or even limit penalties. These criminal groups not
only ensure immunity from prosecution through
payoffs, but could also demand monopoly power
in the illegal market, for example by paying public
officials to intimidate their competitors.6
CORRUPTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
Corruption, for the purpose of this article, is
defined as any intentional and unlawful conduct
or behaviour by persons entrusted with
responsibilities of public office, who violate their
duties as public officials in such a way as to
obtain undue gratification of any kind for
themselves or for others. Such gratification could
include the acceptance of bribes in cash, paid
holidays, or even expensive clothes, in return for
violating the public interest. Corruption manifests
itself as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion,
abuse of power, nepotism, conflict of interests,
insider trading or abuse of privileged
information, and favouritism. In defining
corruption, caution should be used when
referring to corruption interchangeably with
inefficiency and ineffectiveness, as is sometimes
the case. Corruption takes place as an intentional
act of behaviour with the purpose of gaining
some kind of advantage.7
Corrupt government activities can take on many
forms, for instance public officials who deviate
from the prescribed norms, discriminately
administer laws, or adopt a subjective or partisan
approach in dealing with clients, and are
negligent in the performance of official duties.
Corruption is also manifested in the biased
application of rules and the misapplication of
political or administrative power, whether directly
or indirectly, for one’s own financial or material
advantage, or in order to distribute the gains
amongst friends, colleagues, relations or
supporters.8
Corruption is caused by a number of factors,
including psychological, social, economic, and
organisational factors. Organisational factors refer
to excessive discretion, outdated and inadequate
policies and procedures and insufficient
supervision, complex legislation, a lack of ethical
awareness, and deficient control and
accountability. Corruption also has many negative
consequences, for example weakened public
service delivery, the misdirection of public
resources, the inhibition of growth that is
necessary to pull people out of poverty and,
notably, people’s loss of trust in the public service.
In developing countries, corruption has even
worse consequences. Donor countries that might
spend millions on development assistance see
corruption as negative for development.
Corruption results in a levy imposed on the
labour of producers in favour of the occupants of
power. It causes the national inheritance to be
diverted into private or partisan uses, causing a
pernicious drain on the general economy.9
POPULAR FALLACIES ABOUT
PUBLIC SERVICE INTEGRITY
A variety of remedies exist for corrupt behaviour
in the public service. It is generally believed that
ethics training for public officials and political
office-bearers, exemplary ethical behaviour by
political office-bearers and senior public officials,
adequate and fair compensation, codes of
conduct, a free press, and constitutional
mechanisms such as the Public Protector,
Auditor-General and Public Service Commission
will lead to greater integrity.10 These generic
remedies should however be contextualised.
When a country’s public service is professional,
honest, reliable, effective and efficient, exemplary
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ethical conduct by political office-bearers is
slightly less significant on the integrity agenda.
For countries that need an integrity agenda it
remains necessary to decide on a unique ‘cocktail’
of remedies – those that will have the greatest
impact on wrongdoing and misconduct. 
Public service reform
In the 1980s, the United States president declared
that the public service was not the solution to the
problem, but was the problem.  This initiated the
establishment of an international public
administration reform movement that would see
the public service become smaller, operate like its
counterparts in the private sector, and become
more efficient and effective. Public service
managers adopted private sector methods and
strategies, and were given the freedom to manage.
Privatisation and contracting out became popular
means for the delivery of public services. In the
world of ethics and integrity, it was believed that
as the public sector declined in size and scope, so
too would the frequency of corruption and fraud.
Public administration reform turned out to be
fraught with contradictions. People soon realised
that the private sector was not necessarily more
effective and efficient, and that the public interest
ideal – one of the cornerstones of the public
service – was being sacrificed. In fact, the
privatisation of the public service led to the
creation of a scarcity of commodities, thereby
increasing the demand for goods and services and
consequently increasing the motives to pay bribes.
The private sector is also not less corrupt, as is
popularly believed. The Enron scandal in the
United States testified to that.  
Nearly two decades have passed since the ideas of
Osborne and Gaebler were published in
Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial
Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (1992), and
today these ideas have been replaced by a more
moderate approach to public service reform. A
new approach to governance promotes the idea of
government ‘steering’ the activities of a network
of role players, including civil society and the
private sector. Instead of taking on a reduced role
in society, the public service has regained its lost
prominence. South Africa – not unlike many
other developing states – requires a public service
that plays a significant role in addressing the
country’s myriad of welfare, policing and security
challenges.   
Exemplary ethical conduct by
political office bearers 
Political office-bearers are expected to set the
example for ethical conduct in society.
Prosecuting a political office-bearer for
misconduct, it could be argued, would have
positive spin-offs for the integrity agenda.
However, this remedy needs to be contextualised.
Simply stated, legal proceedings have been
instituted against the president of the ruling
political party, Jacob Zuma. Some may argue that
prosecuting Zuma not only provides him with the
opportunity to prove his innocence, but also
entrenches the rule of law and the independence
of the judiciary. These matters have been high on
the agenda of opposition parties and the media.  
Unfortunately, the matter is more complicated. In
the first instance, Zuma must be proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, something very difficult
to establish in a criminal case before the courts.
Furthermore, during 1994 to 1999, Zuma was a
member of a government that was inexperienced
in the art of governing. The majority of members
of cabinet had never served in any government
before. It can be assumed that international
corporations applied a significant amount of
pressure on those individuals responsible for
procurement in the defence acquisition contract
in order to secure a share of its profits. At the
time, the payment of bribes to foreign public
officials was even tax deductible. It was only in
December 1997 that the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) ratified the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions. Members of that first
democratic government had to simultaneously
acquire the skills and expertise to govern, and
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resist attempts to fall prey to the unscrupulous.    
It is thus essential to ask at which point in time
the intangible cost of prosecuting Zuma becomes
greater than the benefit.  Would it not be in the
public interest to pursue a more comprehensive
approach to corruption and its prevention? These
questions raise the need to look at remedies that
are of greater long-term value to South African
society.    
MORE APPROPRIATE MEANS TO
PROMOTE PUBLIC SERVICE
INTEGRITY
A different mixture of remedies for misconduct
and wrongdoing could be considered. These
remedies are not ‘quick fixes’ but would ensure
long-term effectiveness and provide for stability in
South Africa’s maturing democracy. In the
following section these remedies will be
discussed.
Promoting professionalism in the
public service
Making the public service more professional
could reduce the incidence of corruption. This
could be achieved by ensuring that it acts in a
politically neutral way and by advancing the merit
principle in appointing and promoting staff.
Applying the merit system rather than the spoils
system (where supporters of the ruling political
party are appointed to positions of government
authority) would require the ANC to adopt
different human resource practices. The
appointment of senior officials with appropriate
skills and experience will contribute to the
establishment of a public service based on
integrity and ethical conduct.    
A caveat has been raised pointing to the negative
effect of ‘managerialism’ on a professional public
service. New employment trends have been to
appoint senior officials on contract, and not to
tenure them. The neutrality of the public service
is thus inhibited, as officials are not at liberty to
provide ‘frank and fearless’ advice to ministers,
fearing that they might be sacked for
insubordination. Additionally, appointing senior
civil servants on contract allows the minister to
impose a network of patronage – possibly
appointing new staff with allegiance and loyalty to
the governing party and forsaking the experience
and expertise built up over the years by serving
officials.11
A more scientific approach to
misconduct
Public service corruption and incompetence
receives daily exposure in government reports and
the press. This exposure contributes little to
developing a comprehensive approach to ethics
improvement.  Research into ethics management
is a contemporary focus of ethics research. As one
scholar has noted, it is not the composition of
ethics programmes that should be scrutinised – on
that we seem to agree.  Legislation for whistle
blowing and anti-corruption, and policies on
fraud, a code of conduct and disciplinary
processes are established phenomena in the South
African public service. Rather, it is the
implementation of these programmes that we
should focus on. Empirical research has been
vague and provides little indication of how these
programmes function. Research results that
purport to be empirical are at best anecdotal and
impressionistic.  
Research into public service misconduct should be
of longitudinal nature, starting off with baseline
data and following it up with culmination data.
This would allow us to trace improvements in the
level of corruption and fraud in executive agencies
such as the South African Police Service and the
Department of Correctional Services. Identifying
indicators would allow us to focus our
management efforts on developing an appropriate
organisational culture; a sine qua non for effective
ethics and integrity management. The question of
cultural relativism in the public service also
requires further research attention.  
Research into the opportunities for corruption
within a public institution requires the researcher
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to combine the qualitative and quantitative
research approach; triangulated and using a
variety of research methods. Whereas
quantitative structured techniques such as
surveys and experiments provide for a greater
measure of reliability, thus ensuring the same
findings when measurements are repeated,
qualitative research provides for much greater
variation and richness in observing a
phenomenon, and consequently greater validity.
The researcher has to creatively combine these
approaches to obtain an appropriate balance
between validity and reliability.12
Many examples of corruption cited in this
publication are of a hypothetical nature. The
measurement and observation of corruption is
complicated by a number of factors. One such
factor is that the phenomenon is generally not
visible to the social researcher. As corruption is
illegal in most societies, it occurs as a covert
activity.  Perpetrators try to hide their intentions
to extort money or gifts from citizens. Citizens
bribe public officials to gain an unjust advantage
over other citizens. Naturally, when such
wrongdoing is exposed, both parties risk the
possibility of losing their unjust advantage. Public
officials may also lose their upward career
prospects, and business owners stand at risk of
losing their business reputations and future
contractual dealings with the public service. The
state is also prohibited from considering tenders
submitted by individuals appearing on a Register
for Convicted Corrupt Offenders. Criminal
prosecution, possibly resulting in a conviction
accompanied by a criminal record and a fine,
may serve as a further deterrent.13 This obstacle
requires social researchers to work innovatively
to, among others, determine the levels of
corruption and wrongdoing in public
institutions.   
Promoting an appropriate public
service culture
In the above section, reference was made to
establishing an appropriate organisational culture
in the public service. For this purpose, various
indicators have been established, with the
objective to improve management efforts in
establishing a culture of integrity. Some of these
are: 
• Imposing sanctions for deviance from ethical 
norms and principles
• Rewarding exemplary behaviour 
• Promoting an organisational culture where 
employees can openly discuss unethical
conduct without the fear of retribution 
• Ensuring the promotion and appointment of 
public servants committed to the cause of
integrity
• Lobbying the support of labour unions in 
promoting workplace integrity14
For example, when cases of unethical conduct are
openly discussed amongst supervisors and
subordinates in a public institution, it could be
assumed that unscrupulous members of staff
would be less inclined to accept a bribe or extort
a favour. Similarly, the visible enforcement of
disciplinary sanctions against departmental
officials transgressing a code of conduct supports
the promotion of ethical conduct. With
appropriate tools we can measure the
improvement or deterioration of a climate of
open debate and discussion, and also the
enforcement of sanctions, or lack thereof. These
indicators provide management with an
indication of their success or failure in preventing
wrongdoing.  
CONCLUSION
As public resources are a scarce commodity, it
makes sense to focus our integrity efforts on
worthwhile initiatives, such as establishing a
professional public service and undertaking
research projects that provide information about
interventions that can best contribute to, and
result in, long-term gains for both the public
service and society as a whole. By comparison,
public service reform, and prosecuting individual
political representatives for wrongdoing, makes a
rather limited contribution to promoting South
African public service ethics and integrity.    
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